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 Abstract 
I manually collect data on all horizontal merger cases litigated by the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) between 2005-2015 from the DOJ's website by reading the Complaint, 
Competitive Impact Statement, and Final Judgment for a total of 94 cases. I analyze how 
horizontal merger antitrust enforcement is impacted by the 2008 Great Recession and the 
enactment of the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guideline Revision. The total number of 
mergers litigated by the DOJ decreases from 2008-9 corresponding to the nadir of the 
Great Recession. The pro-interventionist 2010 Guidelines lead to an increase in merger 
litigation following its enactment.  I use a linear regression to evaluate which factors 
impact the outcome of the cases following the institution of the Guidelines. I find that 
when the judge is appointed by a democratic president, the merger is more likely to be 
blocked, consistent with a pro-enforcement, democratic ideology. Additionally, as the 
number of anticompetitive reasons against merging increases, the DOJ (plaintiff) is more 
likely to win. The use of the Hypothetical Monopolist Test (HMT) increases following 
2010, and is consisted with the Guidelines’ emphasis on the use of various economic 
formulas. However, I did not see an increase in the use of other economic formulas. 
Based on the rationale cited in the Competitive Impact Statement by the DOJ, antitrust 
litigation appears nonuniform and only minimally effected by the 2010 Guidelines..  
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1 Introduction
The state of a country's economy determines its citizens' well-being. Thus, government
regulation of economic activity must be measured, targeted, and unbiased. Throughout the
last two centuries, mergers have been the focus of market structure and anticompetitive
behavior. Horizontal mergers involve rms that compete in the same market with products
that are substitutable. Horizontal mergers can either benet society by increasing the e-
ciency of rms, or harm society by causing higher prices, lower-quality goods and services,
and a reduction of innovation.
My study includes all horizontal mergers litigated by the DOJ between 2005-2015. I
collect my data manually from the DOJ's website by reading the Complaint, Competitive
Impact Statement, and Final Judgment for a total of 94 cases. I use a linear regression
model based on the one used by Coate (1995) whose study analyzes 48 horizontal merger
cases between 1982-1992 to determine which factors inuence the outcome of a case. I choose
the 2005-15 time period to evaluate the impact of two signicant events: the 2008 Great
Recession and the enactment of the Horizontal Merger Guideline Revision of 2010 on the
DOJ's litigation behavior. My research question has two parts; the rst part is whether and
how the Horizontal Merger Revision of 2010 eects merger enforcement and the second part
compares the number of mergers litigated by the DOJ before and after the Great Recession
of 2008.
The 2010 Guideline Revision is pro-enforcement, because it expands merger analysis by
taking into account the relatively new economic thought regarding the dierentiated product
markets, Upward Pricing Pressure, and diversion ratio, while rebung the strict market
denitions used by parties prior to 2010 to argue for a merger (Polk, D., 2010). I believe
that these newer measures will be cited in the courts' decisions more often after 2010, but my
ndings show little change in their frequency of use by the courts. There is one exception:
the Hypothetical Monopolists Test (HMT) increases in frequency of use after 2010. Next, I
analyze the competitive and anticompetitive arguments used by the court before and after
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the 2010 Revision. I expect the total number of competitive/anticompetitive arguments
to increase after 2010 due to the use of the more comprehensive analysis tools dictated by
the 2010 Guidelines. Moreover, I expect that as the number of anticompetitive arguments
increase in each case, the more likely the merger will be thwarted. My ndings support
these expectations. Subsequently, I hypothesis that market share will be de-emphasized
after 2010, because the guidelines encourage factors other than market share to determine
market power. My data does not support this, because the courts continue to emphasize
market share in their analysis of horizontal mergers after 2010. This may be due to market
share remaining a main determinant of market power for the majority of horizontal mergers.
The 2010 Guideline Revision is written under a pro-enforcement, Democratic President to
compensate for lax enforcement of the previous administration. I evaluate if political party
really matters for the court's interpretation of the law and nd that it signicantly impacts
decisions.The ten year span of my study includes the end of Republican President Bush's
term and the entire term of Democratic President Obama. Lao (2014) and de Figueiredo
(2005) nd political ideology matters with Democrats being pro-enforcement. In contrast,
Coate (1995) nds that the political aliation of the judicial panel has no impact on out-
come. Whereas, I nd that political party eects outcome. Coate's study period spans two
Republican administrations which may account for the dierences in our ndings.
My next question evaluates the eect of the 2008 Great Recession on horizontal merger
activity. Past merger waves correlate with periods of economic growth (Waldman and Jensen,
2013). I nd both a decrease in the total number of mergers submitted for review and the
number of mergers litigated from 2008-9 at the nadir of the recession. As expected, I nd
merger activity follows the business cycle. I also note that there is a jump in the number of
mergers litigated from 2007-8 which plausibly may be due to the excitement relating to the
election of a pro-enforcement president and this jump may have conceivably deepened the
recession by curbing economic growth.
My research adds to the existing literature by analyzing the eect of the most recent
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2010 Horizontal Merger Guideline Revision which is intended to broaden antitrust law en-
forcement. I use a continuous time variable in the model in order capture change in the
DOJ's enforcement over the time period. Additionally, I analyze the number litigated by
the DOJ before and after the Great Recession during which economic activity should decline
and increase with the economic recovery that follows. This analysis has not been previously
done and thus, adds to the existing literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the background of
horizontal merger history, horizontal merger laws, and economic theory of horizontal mergers.
This background is necessary in order to understand all that follows. Section 3 presents the
related literature review. Section 4 delineates the data and methodology. Section 5 provides
the regression results and the discussion. Section 6 aords the concluding remarks.
2 Background
2.1 Horizontal Merger History
In the 1800's monopolies, such as U.S. Steel and Standard Oil, dominate many sectors of
the U.S. economy. They completely control the industry from the supply of the product to the
price. The resulting lack of competition, drives product prices up and product quality down.
Thereby, monopolies jeopardize the U.S. economy. To protect consumers by promoting
competition, President Benjamin Harrison signs the Sherman Act of 1890 which is the rst
antitrust law enacted.1 The law forbids competitors from making agreements that limit
competition. In the years immediately following the Sherman Act, it is not actively enforced.
Ironically, Bittlingmayer (1985) shows that the Sherman Antitrust Act precedes the Great
Merger Wave of 1898-1902 showing that laws need to be carefully crafted to avoid aggravating
the problem they are trying to remedy. The Clayton Act of 1914 strengthens the Sherman
1Source:\FTC Fact Sheet: Antitrust Laws: A Brief History,"FTC.gov, accessed [February
8, 2018], https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/games/off-site/youarehere/pages/
pdf/FTC-Competition_Antitrust-Laws.pdf.
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Act by specifying anticompetitive behavior, specically Section 7 forbids horizontal mergers
of direct competitors (Waldman and Jensen, 2013).
Merger analysis is dierent from other antitrust case analysis in that it is based largely on
prediction. Legally, the analysis measures predictive damages rather than actual damages.
The legal process involves evaluating the economic eects of each proposed merger in an
attempt to predict the economic outcome (Shapiro and Farrell, 2010a). Kwoka and Gu
(2015) nd that courts, in an eort to protect the consumer, are prone to Type I errors (false
positives) where anticompetitive behavior is over-called; whereas Kirkwood (2011) nds that
the courts are prone to Type II errors (false negatives) where anticompetitive behavior is
under-called. Studies that analyze the courts' application of economic theory and antitrust
merger law serve the public by evaluating the accuracy of the process. These types of studies
provide information that can reduce ineciency created by government misapplication of the
law and protect consumers from anticompetitive behavior.
2.2 U.S. Merger Review Process
The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) adjudicate
US merger law. Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Premerger Notication Act (1976), an acquir-
ing rm with \assets or sales in excess of $100 million must report all proposed acquisitions
of assets valued in excess of $15 million to these agencies"(Salop, 1987). A merger cannot
go through until it is reviewed by the FTC or DOJ and they have analyzed the proposed
merger's eects on competition, known as the clearance process (Salop, 1987).
The FTC and the DOJ have niche industries and markets in which they specialize.
The FTC concentrates on cases where there is large consumer spending, such as health
care and professional services. In contrast, the DOJ is in charge of reviewing cases in
telecommunications, banks, railroads, and airlines.2 In the defense industry both agencies
have knowledge, thus either the FTC or the DOJ can review the case. Typically rms have
2 Source:\The Enforcers," FTC.gov, accessed [February 8, 2018], https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/
competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/enforcers.
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to wait 30 days before they receive a decision. Annually, the FTC and DOJ review more
than a thousand antitrust cases and 95% of them do not raise anticompetitive questions.2
If anticompetitive concerns are raised the rm has three choices: withdraw the proposal,
negotiate a method to alleviate the concern, or litigate. Only a small proportion of rms
opt to litigate: 56 out of 7,700 cases between 1982-86 (Salop, 1987). Mergers, per Section 7
of the Clayton Act, are illegal if they decrease competition or create a monopoly. Emphasis
is placed on determining whether the merging entity can set the price higher than the
competitive equilibrium price. Industrial organization economists assist the rms and courts
in performing the analysis.
Posner (1970) nds that between 1915 and 1964, the DOJ wins on average 80.9% of the
time and the FTC wins 70.6% of the time in each 5 year interval. Additionally, the DOJ's
and FTC's probability of winning increases in each successive interval after 1925. The FTC
does not have as high of a success rate as the DOJ. Posner (1970) proposes that antitrust
cases are screened more carefully by the DOJ and that is why they are more likely to win.
The DOJ's high success rate persists in vexing the legal community. As of April 2018, the
DOJ has placed an injunction on the proposed merger of AT&T with Time Warner. When
commenting about this merger, Antitrust Attorney David Goodfriend states that since the
DOJ has won the past 29 out of 30 times in other merger cases, they are likely to win in this
case too (Fox, M., 2017). The DOJ's own website supports these statistics; the DOJ did not
lose any merger cases between 2007 and 2016.3
In contrast to these ndings, Coate (1995) analyzes all horizontal merger antitrust cases
between 1982-92, evenly split between the DOJ and FTC, and nds the FTC and private
parties are more likely to win than the DOJ, and the percentages did not change over the
studys time period. The DOJ wins 27% of the cases and the FTC wins 60% of the cases.
It is unclear why Coate's statistics dier from Posner's. It may be due to the fact that
Coate looks at a later time period with diering antitrust laws and ideology. Alternatively,
3 Source:\Antitrust Division Workload Statistics," FTC.gov, accessed [February 8, 2018], https://www.
justice.gov/atr/file/788421/download.
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Posner (1970) looks at all antitrust cases, while Coate looks specically at horizontal merger
antitrust cases possibly accounting for this disparity.
To eliminate dierences in the success rate between the FTC and the DOJ, I focus on
one plainti, the DOJ. By only looking at cases cleared for further review to the DOJ, I will
identify patterns in the arguments cited in the Competitive Impact Statement which can be
used to model the outcome of future cases. Furthermore, since the time period of study is
2005-15, the arguments cited will be compared before and after the 2008 Great Recession
and the 2010 Merger Guideline Revision to better understand the courts use of the 2010
Guideline and the DOJ's enforcement behavior surrounding the Great Recession.
2.3 Evolution of Antitrust Economic Thought and Law
U.S. antitrust enforcement and policy change with the evolution of economic thought.
The 2010 Guidelines are the most recent revision to antitrust law. The revision is deemed
necessary for multiple reasons: The DOJ cites the main reason for its decision to update the
guidelines is due to a better understanding of unilateral eects, where the merged entity can
act alone to exert market power and harm consumers (Shapiro, 2010). Another reason for
the revision is articulated by Christine Varney, Attorney General at the DOJ, who admits
that the DOJ and FTC seem to be haphazardly making their decisions and feels that the
new 2010 Guidelines would take care of this problem (Shapiro, 2010). The importance of
consistency is reected in the business community who expects the legal community to be
consistent in the handling of antitrust decisions so that rms can make sound decisions about
merger behavior. Updated guidelines are needed to codify legal practice, so decisions are
consistent and protect consumers. For example, the European Antitrust regulators blocked a
merger between UPS and TNT Express, but later allowed UPS' competitor, FedEx to merge
with TNT Express. In February 2018, UPS sued for over $2 billion in compensation. This
appearance of bias in the European courts could be prevented by having more comprehensive
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Looking back at antitrust history, Kovacic and Shapiro (2000) analyze legal philosophy
and economic reasoning in antitrust cases by segmenting the evolution into ve time periods.
The rst period is from 1890-1914. During this incipient stage of antitrust enforcement,
courts are lenient on dominant rms. This laxity is believed to have led to The Great Merger
Wave and precipitated the corrective Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act
in 1914.
In the second period from 1915-1936 antitrust enforcement remains relaxed, in part due
to World War I. The belief in this period is that the government and businesses should work
together in times of peace as they do in war. In this period, support for competition as
well as antitrust policy decreases. Even though the Clayton Antitrust Act is in eect, the
courts continue to use the Rule of Reason to judge corporations' behaviors which results in
lax enforcement. The Rule of Reason calls for enforcement of any \unreasonable restraint
of trade" which allows for a wide spectrum of interpretation. Moreover, despite its recent
establishment, the FTC does not play much of a role in antitrust rulings (Kovacic and
Shapiro, 2000).
In the third period 1936-1972, President Roosevelt has advisors that are in favor of
competition to restore the economy. Noted economist of the era, Henry Simons advocates
for a free market economy. Enforcement of antitrust laws is taken to the extreme. Economies
of scale is downplayed and parallel conduct and price leadership, where rms act in concert
without collusion, are not recognized as competitive behaviors. In the 1950s, industrial
organization theorists begin to focus on the Structure, Conduct, and Performance (SCP)
paradigm which relates conduct, like mergers, to market structure factors, like product
dierentiation and barriers to entry, with performance factors, like eciency and quality.
Despite the SCP paradigm, the courts continue to rely on market concentration (Kovacic
4Source:\UPS Sues EU for $2 billion Over Blocked Merger," by The Associated Press, ABC-
News.com,February 26, 2018, accessed [March 1, 2018], http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/
ups-sues-eu-billion-blocked-merger-53367140.
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and Shapiro, 2000).
The fourth period 1973-1991, is shaped by the fact that the U.S. is losing market share
to international rms. Thus, there is increased support for economies of scale antitrust ar-
guments to justify mergers. Firms with large market shares allow the U.S. to better compete
in international markets. The Chicago School of economic thought dominates antitrust law
enforcement; monopolies can be considered ecient and government should not interfere
as they are prot maximizers (Waldman and Jensen, 2013). Further, the Chicago School
questions per se illegality, such as vertical restraints which may not always obstruct com-
petition. For these reasons, the courts give a higher preference to dominant rms (Kovacic
and Shapiro, 2000). Game theory begins to dominate economists' thoughts on oligopolies.
In game theory, the rm's behavior is predicted based on playing a game; economists must
create assumptions about behavior to model a real rm's decision options. Even the courts
begin using game theory to get colluding rms to tell on each other.
The last period that Kovacic and Shapiro (2000) mention is after 1992. This period
relies more on economic theory leading to cooperation between economists and lawyers in
the analysis of antitrust cases. This period has been marked by an attempt to develop
and use models to properly identify competitive verses anticompetitive behavior. Moreover,
there is an eort to make guidelines so that the courts can more easily and accurately label
anticompetitive behavior. The goal of this is an ecient economy for the public's benet.
My research is important because it looks at the DOJ's decisions from 2005-2015 to
evaluate the court's movement towards its goal of systematic and individualized decisions. I
expect to see an increase in the number of anticompetitive factors cited and more diverse use
of these factors. I will use a continuous time variable to capture the evolution of economic
thought and law.
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3 Literature Review
3.1 Predictors of Horizontal Merger Outcome
3.1.1 Market Structure
The 1982 Guidelines introduce the Hypothetical Monopolist Test (HMT) and the Herndahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) to aid in market denition and share respectively. The 1982 Guide-
lines include the `leading rm provisio' which challenge any merger where the leading rm
has at least 35% market share (Shapiro, 2010). The 1992 Guidelines concede that high mar-
ket concentration can coincide with eciency and competition in certain situations. The
idea that mergers can promote competition is reiterated in the 1997 revision and further em-
phasized in the 2010 Guidelines. The Herndalhl-Hirshman Index (HHI) is used to calculate
the relevant market share, dened as the sum of squared market shares of the rms in the
market. The HHI range ranges from zero (innite number of small rms) to 10,000 (single
rm monopoly):
HHI = S21 + S
2
2 + :::S
2
j =
jX
n=1
S2n (1)
where (S1; S2; :::; Sj) are the market shares of the rms and j is the number of rms in the
market (Waldman and Jensen, 2013). The courts evaluate the post-merger HHI and change
in HHI following the merger. The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines break up markets into
the following categories:5
Unconcentrated Markets: HHIpost < 1; 500 or 4HHI < 100
Moderately Concentrated Markets: HHIpost 2 (1; 500; 2; 500) and 4HHI > 100
Highly Concentrated Markets: HHIpost > 2; 500 and 4HHI > 200
5Source:\Horizontal Merger Guidelines," by The U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission, Justice,gov, August 19,2010, accessed [March 1, 2018], https://www.justice.gov/atr/
horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010.
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With the 2010 Guidelines, mergers in the unconcentrated markets' category are generally
cleared to merge because they do not raise anticompetitive harm. The moderately concen-
trated markets' category need to be examined further for anticompetitive eects. In the
highly competitive markets' category, mergers are blocked unless extensive procompetitive
eects can be demonstrated.
The HMT is used to assess the accuracy of the relevant product market by asking whether
a monopolist rm could impose a small but signicant and nontransitory increase in price
(SSNIP) which increases protability.6 In a merger that creates less elastic demand for the
merged products, the hypothetical monopolist would raise prices (Werden, 2016).
The problem is that markets can be dicult to dene, making the Herndahl-Hirschman
index (HHI) and Hypothetical Monopolist Test (HMT) open to dispute between parties
(Shapiro, 2010). The 2010 Guidelines are intended to de-emphasize market share and make
anticompetitive mergers easier to identify. Another dierence is that the 2010 Guidelines
do not dictate a linear fashion to analyze the antitrust cases; whereas, the 1992 guidelines
give a set formula starting with the market denition, followed by concentration determina-
tion, then competitive eects, then entry, then eciencies, and nally failing rm's defense
(Shapiro, 2010). Although this linear fashion of analysis is dictated, in practice, this method
is not reliably performed by the courts. As early as 1955, economists, such as George Stigler,
express concern that using concentration as a marker for anticompetitive behavior neglects
the middle ground, market concentration between 10% and 75%. Specic questions must be
addressed: what is the critical market concentration; what is a reasonable time period for
entry; what is the cost of Type I errors (Stigler, 1955). Though over the years, the critical
market concentration and reasonable time period for entry have been addressed, the cost of
over-litigating still needs to be dened.
Coate (1995) uses statistical methods to analyze 48 mergers between 1982-1992 evenly
divided between the DOJ and the FTC looking for patterns in the application of antitrust
6Source:\Hypothetical Monopolist Test,"www.law.cornell.edu, accessed [February 8, 2018], https://
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/hypothetical_monopolist_test..
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laws. Coate (1995) nds that the HHI is marginally predictive of outcome and without other
anticompetitive factors, a merger injunction is unlikely. An HHI of 7000 would need two
other anticompetitive factors before the probability exceeds 50% of a merger being stopped
(Coate, 1995). Kwoka and Gu (2015) analyze 40 merger retrospective studies from 1976-
2006 for which the post-merger price has been calculated to compare the predictive value of
event studies to market structure analysis. They nd that market structure analysis is more
accurate in twice the number of cases. For an HHI increase of 100 points post-merger, there
will be a 0.6097 percent increase in price. Kwoka and Gu (2015) nd that the change in the
HHI is more signicant an indicator of a price increase than the HHI itself. The interaction
between the HHI and change in HHI is not statistically signicant. The problem with Kwoka
and Gu's (2015) study is that the structural variables suered from multicollinearity. Both
studies have a small sample size. Kwoka and Gu's study does suggest that HHI is a good
marker for analysis of anticompetitive mergers (evidenced by a price increase), yet Coate
(1995) nds that HHI was of borderline signicance in the court's decision to block a merger.
Given that Kwoka and Gu (2015) nd that the HHI predicts a post-merger price increase,
I plan to include HHI in my research model. I use a model similar to Coate's to see if an
increase in the HHI leads to a decrease in the chance that the defendant will win (Coate,
1995). I will add to Coate's research by expanding the sample size. Additionally, since I
am using a dierent time period than Coate, I will be able to analyze whether the 2010
Merger Guideline has aected the use of the HHI in horizontal merger antitrust decisions
by the DOJ. Since the 2010 Guidelines sought to de-emphasize HHI, I hypothesize that the
HHI and change in HHI from before and after the merger will be less relevant after the 2010
Guideline Revision. I will also evaluate variables other than HHI, but related to market
structure analysis, such as HMT and SSNIP, pre and post the 2010 Guideline Revision. In
my preliminary assessments, courts rely on the HHI, despite the new guidelines. Keyte and
Schwartz (2011) argue that the 2010 Guidelines' de-emphasis of market share is counter
intuitive because market analysis should start with the market denition and concentration.
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3.1.2 Unilateral Eects
The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines Section 2 titled \Evidence of Adverse Compet-
itive Eects" explains the types and sources of evidence that agencies use in competitive
eect analysis. The agencies now realize that changes in market concentration are more
important in coordinated eects than unilateral eects. Unilateral eects between suppliers
of dierentiated products, like pricing and bidding competition, are eliminated following the
merger leading to price increases (Shapiro, 2010). Post-merger coordinated eects make col-
lusion more likely also leading to price increases. Thus, as stated in Section 4 of the Merger
Guidelines, market share and concentration are useful in predicting competitive eects, but
other factors should also be considered. The unilateral price eects in the Guidelines are
now based on the assumption that rms account for opportunity costs and higher costs by
increasing prices. Additionally, the Guidelines now state that unilateral price eects for a
given product are not likely to occur, when the opportunity cost term is a small percent of
the price. The revised 2010 Guidelines stress competitive eects and use merger simulation
models, critical loss analysis, and Upward Pricing Pressure Test (UPP test).
Shapiro and Farrell (2010a) argue that using UPP to screen for unilateral anticompetitive
eects in a dierentiated Bertrand oligopoly is more reliable than market share methods.
In this model, rms simultaneously choose a price. The rm with the lower price will not
steal the whole market, since the products are dierentiated. In the dierentiated market,
mergers result in loss of competition (upward pricing pressure) and marginal cost savings
(downward pricing pressure) both of which oset each other. The net eect of these forces
is used to estimate the UPP for product 1:
UPP1 = D12(P2   C2)  E1C1
Where E1 is the eciency credit of merging for product 1. Thus, E1C1 equals the decrease
in marginal cost to product 1 due to the merger (Shapiro and Farrell, 2010b). The value of
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diverted assets equals the diversion ratio (D12) multiplied by a margin. The diversion ratio is
dened as the cross-elasticity of demand between two products, meaning that the diversion
ratio of product 1 and product 2 is the percent change in units lost in sales of product 1
(4Q1) when its price increases that product 2 captures (4Q2) (Shapiro, 2010). The value
of divested sales when the price of product 1 increases:
Divested Sales = 4Q2  (P2   C2)
Where P2 is the price of product 2 and C2 is the marginal cost of product 2. The value of
divested sales can be rewritten as a proportion in the reduction of sales per unit:
4Q2
4Q1  (P2   C2)
Where 4Q24Q1 is the diversion ratio (D12) times the value of divested sales :
D12(P2   C2)
which is the opportunity cost per-unit of selling product 1 resulting from merging. Scaling
this in terms of the price of product 1, equals the Gross Upward Pricing Pressure Index for
product 1 (GUPP1):
GUPP1=D12
P2 C2
P1
.
Shapiro and Farrell (2010a) note that GUUP formula is easier to use for determining post
merger price increases for dierentiated products than the UPP. Mergers which indicate UPP
or GUUP tendencies are further reviewed by the courts. When UPP is greater than zero,
further analysis should occur (Shapiro and Farrell, 2010a).
UPP can also be used in a Cournot oligopoly with some modications. In the Cournot
oligopoly, rms set quantities and prices will adjust to equilibrate supply and demand. In a
Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous products the UPP can be calculated if it is assumed
that the diversion ratio is one. Also, the UPP can be calculated in the Cournot dierentiated
product market if the price diversion ratio, rather than the quantity diversion ratio, is used
(Moresi, 2009).
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Carlton (2010b) points out that the predictive power of the UPP has not been validated so
courts need to treat it with caution. There are problems with the UPP: not all cost changes
are passed on equally to the consumer, so the same UPP could have dierent price eects. In
a dierentiated product market even with an elevated UPP, a merger could be procompetitive
if, for example, the cost of innovation declined following the merger (Carlton, 2010a). Also,
UPP focuses on a single product which ignores potential price decreases in related products
due to eciency benets of the merger. Moreover, the diversion ratio is actually dicult
to calculate, because the elasticity of demand and marginal cost are hard to estimate. For
marginal cost, average variable cost is usually substituted. Since marginal cost is generally
greater that average cost, average cost tends to overestimate marginal costs. Keyte and
Schwartz (2011) argue that Shapiro's endorsement of the 2010 Guidelines is premature as it
ignores the fact that the UPP has not been shown to consistently predict anticompetitive
eects. Keyte and Schwartz (2011) note that a positive UPP can occur using products of
rms that are not close competitors so they recommend that the UPP be standardized with
clear thresholds. Moreover, unilateral eect models that factor in consumer preferences may
not be economically or legally sound, because the optimal amount of consumer choice is not
known. Keyte and Schwartz (2011) question the practice of dening markets by reasonable
exchangeability as this term is vague. As a result of these problems, the FTC Commissioner
J. Thomas Rosch criticizes the Guidelines' emphasis on economic formulas and price theory
models (Koback et al., 2010).
Critical loss analysis studies competitive behavior in merger analysis. It asks the question
if the price of a good increases by a certain percent, what would have to be the percent
decrease in sales for it to be unprotable to increase the price.
The critical loss formula =
4P
P
4P
P
+P C
P
where P is the price and C is the cost (O'Brien and Wickelgren, 2003). The formula seems
uncomplicated, but the actual estimates of rms' margins (P C
P
) is dicult. The higher the
rms margins, the more inaccurate the relationship between the change in the price and the
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change in sales become (O'Brien and Wickelgren, 2003). This is because rms that have
a higher margin usually have a more inelastic demand leading to a variable eect on sales.
Another problem for critical loss analysis is substitution measured with cross elasticities. If
there is a high cross elasticity between two products of the merging rm, then if the rm
raises the price of product 1, prots will still increase because sales get diverted to product 2
of the merged rm (O'Brien and Wickelgren, 2003). Thus, cross elasticity is not accounted
for in critical loss analysis.
Merger simulation models are used to estimate the post-merger price changes. In general,
this is done by calculating the pre-merger supply and demand curve to get an equilibrium
point. Once the pre-merger supply and demand equations are determined, any variable can
be changed to see its eect on price (Kirkwood, 2011). Merger simulation is a three step
process where pre-merger data is used to calculate product demand. For supply, the type of
oligopoly must be dened then pre-merger marginal costs are used to calculate the supply
curve. Thirdly, post-merger price and quantity is calculated and compared to the pre-merger
levels (Wang, 2013). Modeling is limited by the assumptions of the merger models. Better
assumptions and models are needed to increase their predictive value. Another detractor is
that model simulations do not take into account changes in quality and services (Shapiro,
2010).
I will look at the use of merger simulation models, UPP/GUPP, critical loss analysis,
and diversion ratio pre and post 2010 when the new guidelines were enacted to evaluate the
frequency of their use by the DOJ. I expect use of these tools to increase following the 2010
Guideline revision. To my knowledge, the courts use of these more complicated tools has
not been previously analyzed. These tools have only been studied theoretically.
3.1.3 Barriers to Entry
Joe S. Bain, one of the rst industrial organization economists, coined barriers to entry
as things that allow rms to keep prices above the competitive price while discouraging entry
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(Waldman and Jensen, 2013). The 2010 Guidelines, similar to the 1992 Guidelines, dene
ease of entry as \must be timely, likely, and sucient" to maintain competition (Shapiro,
2010). Ease of entry is estimated by calculating if enough new production could occur within
24 months to oset the hypothetical price increase (Salop, 1987). Barriers to entry can be
structural, inherent to the industry, like cost dierences, legal barriers (patents/license), or
technical equipment barriers. Bain states that economies of scale, absolute cost advantage,
capital requirements, and product dierentiation characterize market structures with barriers
to entry (Waldman and Jensen, 2013).
Economies of scale is when a rms' long run average costs decrease as output increases.
Economies of scale is considered a barrier if there is only enough room for a small number of
rms in the industry, where each rm is producing at the output level that minimizes their
average cost. It is hard to estimate economies of scale.
Economists have techniques to get an approximation of economies of scale, but each
technique is awed: Statistical cost analysis tests how average cost and output are related.
Statistical cost analysis is time consuming to perform. Moreover, it is dicult to obtain
all the data because equipment age, capacity utilization and price of the inputs must be
controlled for when analyzing cost. The survivor test is another method of calculating
approximations for economies of scale. This test analyzes rms over time. Firms that stay
in business will continue to produce either constant or an increasing percent of the industry's
total output. If a rm reduces its percent of the total industry output over time, then the
rm is inecient and will cease to exist (Waldman and Jensen, 2013). This test is easier to
use due to the accessibility of the data, but it is hard to interpret the results.
The absolute cost advantage, another marker of barriers to entry, is when a rm in the
market can produce any quantity of goods at a lower cost than an entrant. To simplify
matters, if the average cost is constant and if the price is set above the average cost of the
rm in the industry, but below the average cost of an entrant, the rm in the industry will
make a prot, but potential entrants would suer a loss in prot if they were to enter. This
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can happen if rms in the market have a monopoly over an input or if they have better
technologies to produce goods. It is challenging to measure absolute cost advantages.
Capital costs act as a barrier to entry because the higher the capital cost, the less likely
it is for a rm to enter the industry. Product dierentiation is another barrier to entry;
irrespective of a price increase above the competitive level, it may not be protable for
competitors to enter the market because consumers may not demand the competitors' dif-
ferentiated product (Waldman and Jensen, 2013).
Barriers could also be strategic, for example, predatory actions rms take to deter po-
tential entry of competitors (Waldman and Jensen, 2013). Predatory actions can be divided
into limit pricing and predatory prices. Limit pricing is where the price is kept articially
low to prevent new rms from entering the market and predatory pricing is where prices are
so low competitors are forced out of the market.
Carlton (2004) criticizes Bain's denition of barriers to entry because the factors he
cites: scale economies, large capital requirements, product dierentiation, and cost advantage
lead to price increases based on Structure, Conduct, and Performance (SCP) which is too
simplistic. Carlton (2004) argues that Bain's denition neglects competition in quality,
advertising, and research and development (R&D). Moreover, barriers to entry deal with
eects in the long run, but antitrust regulation looks for price increases immediately after
the merger. Carlton (2004) questions whether there is any practical use for barriers to entry
in its current form in merger litigation.
Kwoka and Gu (2015) nd that barriers to entry are positively correlated to an increase
in price following a merger. This may suggest that barriers to entry reect market power.
Coate (1995) uses a binary variable for barriers to entry in his model to predict the outcome
of the cases at the DOJ, FTC, and private parties. In my study, similar to Coate's, I will use
a binary variable to record whether barriers to entry are cited in the Competitive Impact
Statement from the DOJ. Coate (1995) concludes that if there are no barriers to entry, the
merger has a low probability of being blocked. In a later study by Coate and Ulrick (2006),
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they look at cases only at the FTC. They use two dierent variables for barriers to entry:
a binary variable, similar to an earlier study by Coate (1995), and another variable which
records the number of barriers from 0-3. The three characteristics that they use for barriers
to entry are timeliness, likelihood, and suciency. Coate and Ulrick (2006) nd, using the
binary variable for barriers to entry, that when there are no barriers to entry, the merger goes
through in all 19 cases, even when the change in HHI is over 2,500. However, when entry
barriers are present, the merger only went through in 20 out of 109 times. Their results
are virtually the same when comparing their two dierent variables for barriers to entry.
Thus, I use the binary variable to capture barriers to entry for its ease of determination. In
my analysis, barriers to entry are frequently cited in the Competitive Impact Statement. I
hypothesize that if there are no barriers to entry the merger will go through. The current
literature has not looked at specic barriers to entry, instead mainly citing barriers as a
binary or tertiary variable. This may be due to the diculties that exist in quantifying
individual barriers and analyzing the vast array of industry specic barriers.
3.1.4 Eciency
Mergers can increase the welfare of society by their potential to result in eciency and
help the merged rm compete in the market leading to decreased prices, improved quality,
and increased services. A merged rm can increase eciency if two inecient rms merge
to become a more ecient one. In the case of unilateral eects, marginal cost reductions
can counteract the incentive of a merged rm to increase its price. Eciencies can also lead
to better quality products.5 In the case of coordinated eects, a marginal cost reduction
may decrease the likelihood of rms coordinating activity, because rms have an increased
incentive to cheat and lower their price. Mergers can help the rms ability to compete, but
at the same time have eects that lessen competition in the market place. For example,
merging may make the rm more ecient, but also give the rm more buying power in the
market which reduces competition.
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It is hard to calculate eciencies. This is because much of the information is private
information kept by the merging rms. Additionally, eciencies are forecasted before the
merger goes through leading to a hypothetical analysis. Some eciencies are easier to verify
than other types. Eciencies from rearranging production between facilities of a merged
rm that were previously separate are easier to quantify than proving eciencies from re-
search and development. Cognizable eciencies are eciencies supported with evidence.
For antitrust purposes cognizable eciencies have more weight in the court room because
they can be measured (Zanfagna, 2010). The 2010 Guidelines strengthen the role of cogniz-
able eciencies and decrease the role played by eciencies that cannot be veried such as
innovation. Going forward, economists need to gure out a way to account for unveriable
eciencies. In the courtroom, eciencies rarely justify monopolization of a market.5
Coate (1995) accounts for eciencies in his study. Eciencies are assigned a binary
variable to record whether the court believes the merger oers any eciencies. The use of
a binary eciency variable does not capture the actual value of eciencies and the size of
its impact on price. However, in my research like Coate's, a binary variable suces, because
I look for the presence of an eciency argument in the Competitive Impact Statement.
Historically, courts have used eciencies to supplement their main argument (Coate, 1995).
I suspect, the supplemental role of the eciency argument is likely due to the fact that
it is hard to quantify and prove. I hypothesize that an eciency argument will have a
small positive impact on the likelihood that the merger will go through due to it playing a
supportive role.
3.1.5 Net Competitive Factors
In antitrust law, arguments are grouped into anticompetitive and competitive reasons
for or against merging. Coate (1995) adds up the number of each to form two indices: pro-
competitive and anticompetitive. These two indices could be thought of as mitigating and
accentuating factors. Anticompetitive factors are \homogeneous products, demand inelas-
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ticity, static technology, and similar cost structure." Competitive factors are \heterogeneous
products, low capacity utilization, and minimal market information."(Coate, 1995). Addi-
tionally, the 2010 Guidelines have been revised to account for the fact that mergers can hurt
consumers by decreasing choice, innovation, quality, and service. When any of these factors
are cited in the decision, I counted each of these as anticompetitive and included them in
my model.
Coate (1995) uses a variable called Netcon which is dened as the number of anticompet-
itive arguments minus the number of competitive arguments for merging. He nds Netcon
to be statistically signicant in predicting outcome, so I will use this variable too. In Coate's
study as the number of anticompetitive arguments increase, the merger is more likely to be
blocked. Coate (1995) argues that merger decisions should be positively related to market
share combined with Netcon.
If it is found that Netcon is negatively correlated to the merger's likelihood of injunction,
then courts' decisions are contrary to economic theory and need further analysis. It would
also raise concern that the court's decision is biased in some way. Unlike Coate, my dates
will look at changes in use of these factors pre and post the 2010 Guideline revision. I
hypothesize that the number of anticompetitive eects will increase in number after 2010,
because the stated goal of the 2010 Guideline is to be more comprehensive.
3.2 Jurisdiction
An antitrust complaint is made by a plainti who can be a private individual, a com-
peting rm, a business organization, or even the Antitrust Division of the FTC or DOJ.
Typically, complaints from private parties exceed the government's complaints. For exam-
ple, between 2000-2004, private parties led 93.7% of all cases (Waldman and Jensen, 2013).
Plaintis choose a jurisdiction to le their case where they believe they will win. Perlo
et al. (1996) analyze 1,959 private antitrust cases led between 1973-1984 in ve district
courts. Perlo et al. (1996) did the rst study to look at the eect that the jurisdiction has
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on outcome of an antitrust case. Although his paper is not limited to horizontal mergers,
Perlo et al. (1996) nd that the jurisdiction is a statistically signicant predictor of out-
come. They nd that a plainti is more likely to win in San Francisco or New York than
Chicago or Kansas. Additionally, Perlo et al. (1996) nd that plaintis have an increased
probability of winning if the market is international, national or local; instead of located in
just one state. de Figueiredo (2005) evaluates telecommunication cases put before the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) from 1990-95 and is able to show that defendants'
behavior adjusts for the expected judicial decisions. In other words, plaintis anticipate the
court's sympathies, and if they have the ability to choose a jurisdiction, they will pick a
more sympathetic one or decide not to merge if they do not expect to win. I collected data
on jurisdiction, but was not able to use it for analysis because 83 out of 94 of my cases were
tried in the District of Columbia. Thus, I did not have a wide variation in jurisdiction and
cannot make any conclusions.
3.3 Industry of Plainti and Defendant
Perlo et al. (1996) nd that the industry of the plainti and defendant aects the
outcome of the antitrust case. Manufacturing and wholesale sector plaintis are more likely
to win than service sector plaintis. Additionally, defendants in the service industry are
more likely to win than manufacturing, transportation, and retail. The authors' hypothesis
is that plaintis have a decreased probability in winning in those sectors in which there is
asymmetric knowledge and the principle-agent issue exists. The problem is that Perlo et al.
(1996) does not explain how he came to his conclusion regarding asymmetric information and
the principle-agent problem. In contrast, Coate and Ulrick (2006) analyze cases reviewed
by the FTC and divided into four groups: oil, grocery, chemical, and other industries from
1996-03 and nd no dierences in enforcement based on industry. Since they only look at
four categories, it may not give the full picture of enforcement by industry.
My plainti is always the DOJ which diers from Perlo et. al. and Coate and Ulrick's
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study. I examine whether certain industries are more likely to be pursued for horizontal
merger activity. Perlo et al. (1996) look at private party antitrust cases from 1973-83,
whereas Coate and Ulrick (2006) and I look at horizontal mergers only. Moreover, each of
our studies use a dierent time period for analysis which further confounds any comparison.
3.4 Philosophical Bias in the Courts
The 2010 Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines reect the Obama administration's \in-
tent to pursue a more activist agenda" than previously pursued (Koback et al., 2010). The
U.S. guidelines shape global antitrust law. The new guidelines are pro-enforcement and likely
to result in more challenges to mergers. The new guidelines mean that companies will need
to send more information to the courts for review at an earlier point in the investigation
(Koback et al., 2010). This will lead to longer and costlier investigations. Economists will
need to be hired to make economic arguments earlier on in the challenge.
Lao (2014) denes a conservative antitrust policy as non-interventionist toward the domi-
nant rm's conduct often associated with the Chicago School and a liberal antitrust approach
as interventionist and associated with the Post-Chicago School. Lao argues that evidence
is interpreted through the lens of one's ideology, particularly regarding areas of antitrust
law where economic theory is unresolved (Lao, 2014). For instance, in the case of exclu-
sionary dealings, Post-Chicago school would nd it anticompetitive. The Chicago school
believes exclusive dealings do not impede competition and because the dominant rm pays
for the exclusivity, the practice must improve eciencies. Also, Lao sites monopolization
and its eects on innovation as an area of dispute amongst economists. Conservatives lean
towards seeing a positive impact on innovation within monopolies, whereas the liberals see
the negative eect on innovation. Conservatives generally trust the markets and approach
businesses with a laissez-faire approach. Contrarily, liberals distrust the markets and believe
government intervention is needed to protect consumers (Lao, 2014). Following the 2008 -
nancial crisis, even some well-known conservatives, previous Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan
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Greenspan and Judge Richard Posner, feel that the government should have done more to
prevent anticompetitive behavior in the banking industry.
John de Figueiredo's investigation nds that ideology matters. He studies FCC decisions
from 1990-95 and nds judicial ideology aects the outcome of telecommunication cases.
Plaintis pick the cases that they litigate based on the ideology of the court (de Figueiredo,
2005). In contrast, Coate (1995) nds plaintis are no more likely to win whether the case was
heard by a judicial panel dominated by Republican or Democratic appointees. de Figueiredo
(2005) further emphasizes court bias by nding that Republican panels have an increased
probability of overturning decisions from a Democratic agency, than a Republican agency.
The same holds true for a Democratic panel. The fact that there is a perceived bias in
courts' interpretation of the law based on ideology is concerning.
Antitrust decisions should be based on sound economical and mathematical theories
with the welfare of the economy at heart, rather than ideological. My research compares
antitrust decisions before and after the 2008 Great Recession and before and after the 2010
Guidelines. I expect that my study will nd stricter enforcement of antitrust cases under
President Obama, since he is pro-enforcement. I will look at the political aliation of the
president who appointed the judge to see whether this aects the outcome of the case. I
expect if the appointing president is a Democrat, the judge will have a pro-enforcement bias
and the merger will more likely be blocked. I also expect the lessons learned from under-
enforcement, which in part led to the Great Recession, will cause a backlash of enforcement
following 2008. The combined impact will synergistically aect enforcement. The eect of
these two forces on antitrust enforcement has not been studied previously.
3.5 Summary of Literature Review
Coate's study will serve as the basis for my research. He analyzes all horizontal merger
FTC and DOJ cases from 1982-92. One problem with his study is that he has a small sample
size. I will look at double the number of cases in a more recent time period. Also, I add a
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continuous time variable to account for the variations that occur year to year. Additionally,
Coate (1995) nds that the president's political aliation who appointed the judge is not
the deciding factor of a case, but throughout his study's time period a Republican was in
oce. My study period has a Democrat and Republican president, so I may reach a dierent
conclusion. Similar to Coate (1995), I look at HHI and Netcon, but add HMT, diversion
Ratio, GUPP, UPP, and Bertrand Simulation. I will use an eciency binary variable in my
model. Coate (1995) also had an eciency binary variable, but did not add it to his model.
Like Perlo et al. (1996), I look at the jurisdiction of the court and industry of the rm.
4 Data and Methodology
4.1 Data
I manually collect data from all horizontal mergers listed on the DOJ's website cleared
for litigation in which the complaint is led between the years 2005-2015. A total of 94
case lings meet this criteria. Data is primarily collected from the Complaint, Competitive
Impact Statement, and the Final Judgment. The date of the complaint and case violation
is recorded. I convert the industry of the defendant to a three-digit number at the sub-
sector level using the North American Classication System (NAICS). If a defendant is in
multiple industries, I choose the dominant one. The date of the nal judgment is used as the
end date of the case. The judge at both the complaint and the nal judgment is recorded.
The political party of the president who appointed the judge making the nal decision is
included in the analysis. The president's political aliation is used as a proxy for the judge's
political aliation because generally the judge's political aliation is not publicly available.
Generally, the president's political aliation should align with his/her appointees.7 I use a
binary variable (0 if the president was a Republican and 1 if a Democrat). If either the judge
7Source:\How Judges and Justices Are Chosen,"ushistory.org, accessed [February 8, 2018], http://www.
ushistory.org/gov/9d.asp.
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or the political party of the president is unknown, I assign a 3 to the case. The problem
with my study and Coate's is that there is little variation in the number of presidents (2
presidents).
I observe that the pre, post and change in HHI is not reported in a standardized way.
Usually, it can be found in the Complaint or Competitive Impact Statement. However, if it
is not mentioned in either of these two documents, I look in every other document to ensure
I do not miss it. Additionally, in some cases multiple HHI's are given. In this case, I use the
HHI of the most concentrated market.
Barriers to entry and existence of eciency are each separately measured with a binary
variable: 1 if present and 0 if not present. Usually these two variables are stated in the
Competitive Impact Statement. I nd that the cases are not standardized; some cases
explicitly state that there are no eciencies or barriers to entry from merging, but other
times, one or both variables are never mentioned. If eciencies or barriers to entry are not
mentioned, I make the assumption that the variable of interest is not present and assign it
a zero.
The relevant market is usually found in the Competitive Impact Statement. After col-
lecting the relevant market, I group these markets following Perlo et al. (1996) into the
following categories: U.S., region, world, and local. However, in addition to their categories,
I add a North America market category as it is cited as a market in my data.
Similar to Coate (1995), I count the number of anticompetitive and competitive reasons
for merging listed in the Competitive Impact Statement to calculate a variable which Coate
(1995) calls Netcon. Like Coate (1995), I will call this variable Netcon. It is calculated
by subtracting the total number of competitive factors from the anticompetitive ones. If
Netcon is positive, the anticompetitive factors outnumber the competitive factors. Examples
of anticompetitive factors are: price increases, reduced capacity, reduced quality, reduced
services, reduced investment, inelastic demand, transparent market information, increased
HHI, and homogeneous products. Competitive factors would be: heterogeneous products,
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low market information, low capacity utilization, and decreased HHI.
The Hypothetical Monopolist Test variable was treated as a binary variable. If HMT is
used in the analysis, I assign it a one and if it is not cited, I assign it a zero. My research
looks at the frequency of its use, rather than the impact of its size on the merger outcome.
I determine the case outcomes by reading the Final Judgment Statement. The assump-
tions I make are: if part of the rm is divested, I conclude that the defendant lost; if the
defendant dropped its eort to merge, I conclude that the defendant lost.
4.2 Descriptive Analysis
I expect the total number of horizontal merger cases submitted for review to decline
during the 2008 recession and rebound during the recovery based on historical data which
document merger waves coinciding with economic booms (Waldman and Jensen, 2013). After
the 2010 recovery from the Great Recession, I expect an uptick in merger activity due to
either more merger activity in a bullish market or less mergers stopped by a pro-competitive
court in an eort to spur the recovery. Figure 1a is created from the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Annual Report of all horizontal merger cases reviewed by the FTC and DOJ. Figure 1a shows
that the total number of horizontal merger cases decreased from 2008-2009 corresponding
to the Great Recession and than slowly trends upward with the recovery. This is consistent
with my hypothesis.3
Figure 1b is created with the cases actually litigated by the DOJ from 2005-2015 and
used for my dataset. Litigation peaks in 2008 at the start of the Great Recession. This
could indicate the government's excessive zeal in antitrust enforcement with the election of a
pro-enforcement president and serve to compensate for the previous administrations Laissez-
faire approach. Ultimately, the pro-enforcement DOJ could be seen as either a cause of or
a response to the Great Recession.
My hypothesis is that the number of horizontal merger cases reviewed by the DOJ will
increase after 2010 due to the more comprehensive, updated 2010 Merger Guidelines which
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make it easier to identify anticompetitive behavior. As expected, Figure 1b, shows that the
total number of cases reviewed after the 2010 updated Guidelines is more than before. The
impact of the 2010 Merger Guidelines and the recovery from the Great Recession work in
opposite directions on the number of merger events. My hypothesis is that the number of
horizontal merger cases reviewed by the DOJ increased after 2010 due to the new admin-
istration's more comprehensive, updated 2010 Merger Guidelines which make it easier to
identify anticompetitive behavior. Conversely, the number of mergers decrease with reces-
sions (Waldman and Jensen, 2013). The downward eect of the slow recovery on merger
litigation activity will mitigate the upward eects of a pro-enforcement president and the
comprehensive 2010 Merger Guidelines. The net eect of this may explain the lack of a
signicant trend in gure 1b.
Figure 1a and 1b both show a decrease in the number of merger cases in 2008 to 2009,
corresponding to the Great Recession. Additionally, in 2010 to 2011 the number of cases
increases, corresponding to the economic recovery. However, Figure 1a relates more to the
total number of mergers submitted reecting the overall economy. Whereas, Figure 1b
reects government's interventions as it is the number of merger cases litigated by the DOJ.
(a) Total Number of Horizontal Merger
Cases Submitted to the FTC and DOJ for
Review between 2005-2015
(b) Number of Horizontal Merger Cases that
the DOJ Litigated from 2005-2015
Figure 1: Number of Horizontal Merger Cases Over Time
Figure 2 shows that judges who are appointed by Democrats are more pro-enforcement
than judges appointed by Republicans. My preliminary results in Figure 2 go along with the
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ndings of de Figueiredo (2005) and contrast to Coate (1995). However, since the sample
size is small (only 94 cases), no real conclusions can be made.
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Figure 2: Cases Won and Lost by Political Aliation of Judge
Table 1 shows that when there is no eciency argument, the defendant loses 62 cases and
wins 4. In contrast, when there is an eciency argument, the defendant loses 27 cases and
wins 1. Thus, the eciency argument does not seem to have a signicant eect on outcome.
Coate (1995) nds that eciencies are used to supplement arguments. However, eciencies
are never the only reason for a decision. Though, my sample size is larger than Coate's, it is
still small and the defendant almost always loses. Thus, it is dicult from my preliminary
analysis to evaluate how the eciency argument is related to the outcome of the decision.
Eciency Defendant Loses Defendant Wins Total
No 62 4 66
Yes 27 1 28
Total 89 5 94
Table 1: Existence of Eciency in Cases Won Vs. Not Won
Figure 3 shows that the eciency argument is used less after the 2010 Guidelines. I
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thought it would be used more, since the 2010 Guidelines emphasize using cognizable e-
ciencies. A possible explanation for the decline in the eciency argument may be the small
sample size or the fact that unveried eciencies became de-emphasized in the new guide-
lines. The other reason for this result is that out of 94 cases the defendant only wins 5 times.
Thus, they may not have provided a compelling argument, like the eciency argument, for
why the merger is procompetitive.
Figure 3: Mean Eciencies Between 2005-2015
Figure 4 shows the use of the HMT in antitrust arguments signicantly increase over
time after the 2010 Guideline revision. This ts my expectation as courts are using more
accurate tools to dene the relevant market.
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Figure 4: Mean Use of HMT Between 2005-2015
Table 2 illustrates the fact that the total number of anticompetitive arguments increase
from 2008-2011 and than dropped o. I hypothesize that the number of anticompetitive
arguments will increase after 2010 since the Guidelines are meant to be comprehensive and
encourage this analysis. This is not reected in my results. The big spike in the number of
anticompetitive arguments in 2008-2011 may be due to the new administration enthusiasm
for enforcement to over-correct for the under-enforcement that is partially attributed to the
Great Recession.
Number of
Anti-Competitive
Arguments 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
4 1 1 0 8 1 7 4 2 3 1 2
5 0 1 1 2 1 2 6 1 1 1 0
6 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Total 2 2 1 12 3 10 11 3 5 3 2
Table 2: Number of Firms Having 4 or More AntiCompetitive Arguments by Year
Figure 5 shows that Telecommunications, followed by Broadcasting, have the largest
numbers of contested mergers. This may be in part due to the structural dierences of
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Telecommunications and Broadcasting which are natural monopolies with high barriers to
entry. Another possible explanation is merger activity increases following deregulation of
the industry (Waldman and Jensen, 2013).
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Figure 5: Horizontal Mergers by Industry
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4.3 Methodology
I use a linear regression model to predict the outcome of antitrust cases. My model is
based on the one used by Coate (1995). I added to his model a continuous time variable and
an eciency argument. Coate (1995) uses a time index dened as the number of months
between the nal decision date and the start of the study in January of 1982. Coate (1995)
did not nd changes in the Guidelines in 1984 and 1992 eected the outcome. In contrast
to Coate, I will use a continuous time variable which is better suited to capture eects over
time. Although Coate (1995) uses barriers to entry, I omit it. This is because all, except 2
of my cases, have barriers to entry, essentially making it a constant. Thus, conditional on
barriers to entry the setup is as follows:
DefendantWinsi = 0+1NetConi+2PostmergerHHIi+3Efficiencyi+4CaseLengthi+
5FinalJudgmentY eari + "i
DefendantWinsi = 0+1NetConi+2PostmergerHHIi+3Efficiencyi+4PoliticalPartyi+
5CaseLengthi + 6FinalJudgmentY eari + "i
DefendantWinsi = 0 + 1PoliticalPartyi + 2RelevantMarketCategoryNumberi +
3CaseLengthi + 4FinalJudgmentY eari + "i
Where:
DefendantWinsi is a dummy variable for if the defendant wins case i, taking on a 1 if the
defendant wins and a 0 if the defendant loses.
NetConi is the number of anticompetitive arguments minus the number of competitive ar-
guments for case i.
PostmergerHHIi is the post-merger HHI for case i.
Efficiencyi is a dummy variable for if there is a eciency argument for case i, taking on
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a 1 if there is an eciency argument for merging and a 0 otherwise.
Caselengthi is the length of the case from the complaint to the nal decision of case i in
months.
FinalJudgmentY eari is a dummy variable for the year case i ended as stated in the Final
Judgment.
PoliticalPartyi is the political aliation of the president who appointed the nal decision
judge for case i, taking on a 0 for Republican and 1 for Democrat.
RelevantMarketCategoryNumberi is a dummy variable for the relevant market cited in the
Competitive Impact Statement for case i, taking on a 0 for world, 1 for North America, 2
for U.S., 3 for region and 4 for local.
My hypothesis were as followed:
Hypothesis 1: As Netcon increases the defendant is more likely to lose because the anti-
competitive arguments outweigh the competitive arguments (i.e., 1 and 1 will be negative).
Coate (1995) denes anticompetitive factors as \homogeneous products, demand inelas-
ticity, static technology, and similar cost structure." Competitive factors are \heterogeneous
products, low capacity utilization, and minimal market information." Since Coate (1995)
nds that Netcon is inversely related to the defendants chance of winning and it intellectually
makes sense, I expect to nd the same results.
Hypothesis 2: As Post-Merger HHI increases the defendant is more likely to lose (i.e., 2
and 2 will be negative).
This hypothesis goes along with market share theory. Defendants with a bigger market
share post-merger are less likely to win the case, because merging results in increased market
power. In the 2010 Guidelines, if the post-HHI is greater than 2,500 the merger is unlikely
to go through unless there is strong evidence of procompetitive eects from merging.
Hypothesis 3: When an eciency argument is used the defendant is more likely to win
(i.e., 3 and 3 will be positive).
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Antitrust law allows for mergers if they result in an increased ability for the merging rm
to eciently compete resulting in better quality, reduced prices, or better services. Courts
use the eciency argument to support their main argument for merging. Thus, rms that
can prove that the merger increases their eciency, have an increased chance of winning the
case.
Hypothesis 4: As the length of the case increases, the defendant chance of winning is
unchanged (i.e., 4, 5, and 3 will be zero).
As the length of the case increases, the arguments will become more complex. However,
the chance of the defendant winning or losing is unchanged, because complexity potentially
benets or harms either party.
Hypothesis 5: Over the study's time period, the defendant's chance of winning remains
unchanged (i.e., 5, 6, and 4 will be zero).
Justice Stewart said that the government always wins in regards to antitrust cases (Salop,
1987). Additionally, Posner (1970) believes the DOJ screens cases carefully and that is why
they win. Thus, DOJ has case selection bias.
Hypothesis 6: When the political party of the president who appointed the judge is a
Democrat the defendant is less likely to win (i.e., 3 and 1 will be negative).
There is conicting ndings when evaluating political biases in the courts. Democrats are
interventionists and pro-enforcement (Lao, 2014). Additionally de Figueiredo (2005) nds
that ideology matters in the courts. In contrast to these studies, Coate (1995) nds that
whether a case is heard by a Democrat or Republican, it will not eect the outcome. I expect
political party to matter in my data, because of the time period of my study which includes
the election of a pro-interventionist president and the rebound eect of a recession partly
caused by under-regulation
Hypothesis 7: When the relevant market is the world, the defendant is more likely to win
(i.e., 2 will be positive).
When the market is broadly dened, it's harder to have market power.
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5 Results and Discussion
5.1 Regression Results
Table 3 presents the results from the linear regressions. In Columns 1 and 2 of Table
3, cases without a post-merger HHI were dropped (29 cases), providing a total of 65 obser-
vations. Column 1 and Column 2 show that an 1,000 unit increase in the HHI, decreases
the defendants probability of winning by a small magnitude of approximately 0.7%, holding
all other variables constant. The sign of the coecient matched my hypothesis and aligns
with Coate's ndings. However, whereas Coate (1995) nds an increase in the post HHI is
marginally signicant, my results are not signicant. This is likely due to my data's high
pre-merger HHI. Notably, the mean pre-merger HHI of my data is 3,908 with a standard
deviation of 1,717. Thus, the pre-merger HHI was already in the range of a moderately
to highly concentrated market before the merger went through (refer to page 12). Given
that the market is already concentrated before merging, any further increase will have less
eect on the court's decision; without extensive procompetitive evidence, the merger will be
blocked.
Additionally, if Netcon increases by 1, meaning there is one more anticompetitive argu-
ment, the defendant has a 3.9% decrease in probability of winning holding all other variables
constant. This result is statistically signicant at the 5% level. My nding aligns with
Coate (1995). This is consistent with my hypothesis and shows courts are making decisions
consistent with economic theory.
With an eciency argument, the defendant has approximately a 7% increase in proba-
bility of winning the case holding all other variables constant. This result aligns with my
hypothesis, though not signicant. Column 2 and 3 show that if the political party of the
president who appointed the judge is a Democrat, the defendant has a decreased probability
of winning holding all other variables constant. This result also aligns with my hypothesis.
This variable is signicant in column 3 at the 5% level. This is in contrast to Coate (1995)
38
who nds that the political aliation of the judge does not matter. The disparity between
our research may be due to the fact that our research studies dierent time periods. In
his study period both presidents are Republican, George H.W. Bush and Ronald Reagan.
Whereas, my study spans a Republican and Democratic administration, George W.Bush and
Barack Obama. Another possible explanation for the dierence, is that I only look at 94
cases where the DOJ was the plainti; whereas, Coate (1995) looks at 48 cases with some
plaintis being the DOJ, FTC, or private parties.de Figueiredo (2005) and Lao (2014) nd
political aliations matter in court decisions similar to in my study and in contrast to Coate
(1995).
Column 3 shows that compared to the world market, defendants whose market is North
America, U.S., region, or local are less likely to win though not signicant. This trend is
consistent with my hypothesis: when the market is broadly dened it is harder to show
market power. When the case length increases by one month the defendant has -0.318%
decrease chance in winning in Table 3 Column 1 and the nding is consistent across all
the tables. This result is small in magnitude and not signicant. It shows a trend towards
increasing court review length reecting increasing complexity and more likely for the DOJ
to win. This trend is not consistent with my hypothesis of neutrality.
Interestingly, if the year is 2011, there is an increased chance that the defendant will
win compared to 2010 in all three regressions of Table 3. This is signicant at the 1%
level. This is counterintuitive, because after the 2010 Guidelines it would make sense that
the defendant would have a decreased probability of winning, as the guidelines got more
comprehensive and the administration is pro-enforcement. A plausible explanation is that
the updated guidelines lead to an overzealous screening process, including proposed mergers
with a strong competitive defense that can win in court.
In Table 4, I run the same regressions as the ones in Table 3. The only dierence is
that instead of using the post-merger HHI, I use the change in the HHI. I did this because
Kwoka and Gu (2015) nd the change in HHI is more predictive of a price increase than
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HHI itself. Thus, if the change in HHI is a better predictor of an anticompetitive price
increase, then maybe the change in HHI is also a better indicator of a merger being blocked.
In my study, 40 cases for which the change in HHI is not given are dropped. This results
in 54 observations. When the change in HHI increases by 1,000 points, the defendant has
an approximately 1.8% decrease chance of winning which is small in magnitude. However,
the coecient is larger in magnitude when I used the change in HHI compared to post HHI,
however in neither case are the results signicant. When I used the change in HHI in my
model (Table 4 Column 2), instead of post HHI (Table 3), the signicance of the year 2011
decreased from at the 1% signicance level to a 5% signicance level.
Table 5 is the same regressions as Table 3; but I look at the years after 2010. The data
I collect contains 44 cases before 2010 and 50 cases after. Regression's 1 and 2 of Table
5 have 34 observations. This is because all cases before 2010 which do not have an HHI
are dropped. For Column 1 and 2, Netcon is now signicant at the 1% level, whereas in
Table 3 it was only signicant at the 5% level. The model also shows, the defendant has
a statistically signicant increased chance of winning in 2011, than in all years afterwards.
I wanted to make the same regression for before 2010, however there is no year that the
defendant wins, so this is impossible to do. In regression 3, all cases that are before 2010 are
dropped, resulting in 50 observations. In Table 5 Column 3, when the U.S. is the relevant
market, it has an increased chance of winning compared to the world, which is dierent
than Table 3 Column 3, and does not align with my hypothesis. However, the magnitude of
the coecient is small and the relevant market is not statistically signicant in any of the
regressions.
5.2 Discussion
My results align with most of my hypotheses. Eciencies and the world market (Table 3
Column 3) result in an increased chance that the merger will go through, though my results
are not signicant. Post-HHI, Change in HHI, Netcon, and Democratic appointed judges
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decreased the chance of the merger will going through. Netcon is statistically signicant
in all regressions and political party is signicant in one out of two regressions in Table 3
(Column 3 signicant). Change in HHI is larger in magnitude than the post-HHI concurring
with Kwoka and Gu (2015). Intuitively, a merger that dramatically changes your market
share will aect market power more than looking at a rms' total, absolute post-merger HHI.
In other words, a merger that lets a rm change from an HHI of 1,500 to 2,500 raises more
competitive concerns than a merger that raises a rms HHI from 2,500 to 2,600.
Interestingly, in the end year 2011, the defendant is more likely to win than any other
year. This may have something to do with the implementation of the 2010 Merger Guideline
Revision, yet it did not persist. It may be that because of the new guidelines, the court
cleared more cases to the DOJ for further review and this resulted in Type I errors, where
anticompetitive behavior is over-called so at trial more defendants than in previous years are
found innocent and allowed to merge.
The problem with using a linear model in my study is that the predicted values are
not bounded between zero and one. I tried using a probit and logit model, but too many
observations are dropped as 2011 predicted the data perfectly and the other years predicted
failure perfectly. This is because there is not enough variation in the dependent variable. To
check the robustness of my results, I ran the same regressions as in Tables 3, 4, and 5 except
that instead of using the year the nal decision occurred, I use the year the case opened,
dened as the year of the complaint as an alternative measure. My results are similar, as
seen in Table 6, 7, and 8. Additionally, I did a robustness check for standard errors. My
results have the same direction coecients, but nothing is signicant. This is due to the
small sample size.
When reading the case decisions to collect data, I discover that the decisions are not stan-
dardized. This made the collection of data challenging. It raises questions about the consis-
tency of the decision process. I nd that updated formulas like diversion ratio, GUPP/UPP,
and linear Bertrand simulation models are rarely cited in the arguments. The courts are
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either not using these tools or just not citing them. In either case, the process should be
transparent and consistent.
My research nds that the DOJ wins nearly all the time, 89 out of 94 cases which required
litigation in the time period. This is due to a selection bias, because the DOJ decides which
merger cases to litigate. Because the DOJ's success rate is nearly 100%, I am not able
to include enough data from mergers which are allowed to proceed (5 cases). This left
me to mainly evaluate the factors that blocked mergers have in common. Without a large
enough comparison group, I am unable to determine whether blocked cases are fundamentally
dierent than the ones that are allowed to merge.
6 Conclusion
Traditionally, horizontal merger guidelines emphasize market power which equates to the
ability to set prices higher than the competitive price level. It is understood that cost savings
from eciencies result from mergers and may counteract any price increase resulting from
the increase in market power. Merger guidelines help the enforcement agencies determine the
balance between market power and eciency. Antitrust laws exist to protect the free market;
over or under enforcement (Type I or II errors) of the law is inherently anticompetitive. Thus,
error on the part of the DOJ leads to market ineciency.
Despite the importance of merger law enforcement, the actual guidelines themselves tend
to be ambiguous. Mergers can be seen as `reasonably necessary' due to factors like price
savings from economies of scale or from direct technological advances. The cost benet
analysis between eciencies and market power is dicult to calculate and open to contro-
versy. Moreover, the denition of `consumer welfare' can be interpreted as either the welfare
of `purchasers of products' or `aggregate economic eciency'. Courts must dene, measure,
and weight each variable. A small change in a denition results in big change in merger
permissiveness/restrictiveness.
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Because the law is open to interpretation, the ideology of the courts potentially exacer-
bates the problem of inconsistent application of antitrust law. I nd that ideology matters.
If a Democratic president appoints the judge who decides the case, the merger is more likely
to be blocked and this is statistically signicant in Table 3 Column 3 and Table 5 Column 3
at the 5 and 1% level, respectively. Democrats tend to be pro-enforcement; in fact, the 2010
Guideline Revision is drafted under democratic President Obama.
My research lls a gap by adding a continuous time variable into a model to account for
the variation in merger enforcement at the DOJ over the time period 2005-2015. I chose this
time period so that the impact of the 2010 Merger Guideline Revision on merger litigation
can be analyzed. I evaluate whether the more comprehensive guidelines eect the court's
analysis by looking at the change in the use of variables cited in the court's arguments
before and after 2010. The guidelines allow for use of factors other than market share and
for arguments regarding mergers in the dierentiated product market, while increasing the
use of the eciency defense argument. I ran a linear regression model to determine which
variables increase the probability of the defendant winning.
I did not nd that the 2010 Merger Guideline Revision impacts merger analysis as per the
Competitive Impact Statements or courts decisions. Although, the 2010 Merger Guidelines
are more comprehensive and look at factors other than the HHI in promoting competition,
courts are not rigorously analyzing the cases. The diversion ratio is used in 4 cases and the
UPP is only cited in 1 case. Additionally, in only one of the 93 cases, is the linear Bertrand
model simulation conducted. As I obtain my data from a publicly available website, these
more rigorous analysis, which the courts could have used, may not be publicly available.
Another explanation could be that the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines are not used in
practice. For certain, the courts' are not consistent in their analysis method.
Despite inconsistencies in courts analysis, my ndings show a trend generally consistent
with economic theory and the spirit of the 2010 Guidelines. I nd that as the number of
anticompetitive factors cited increase, the merger is more likely to be stopped and this is
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statistically signicant at the 5% level in Tables 3 and 4. Though not statistically signicant,
I nd that as the HHI and change in HHI increase, the merger is more likely to be blocked.
Conversely, if there is an eciency argument, the merger is likely to proceed, though this is
not statistically signicant.
I nd that the DOJ wins nearly 100% of the time so there is little variation in the
dependent variable and the outcome can not be predicted. Future research could extend the
time period to expand the sample size or add additional plaintis such as private parties or
the FTC. This may give more varied outcomes. If future studies have wider case outcomes,
they could use support vector machine to categorize and predict whether the defendant will
win or lose the case. Alternatively, future research could compare cases screened but not
litigated to the ones litigated. By using litigated and not litigated data sets, the current
literature will be expanded by examining the federal selection process to conrm the process
is based on economic theory and unbiased.
A limitation of Coate's study and mine is that we made eciencies and barriers to
entry binary variables for ease of analysis. Future research could separate each into specic
types of barriers to entry or eciency to see if that eects the outcome of the case. Since
cognizable eciencies are given more weight by courts, if future studies separate cognizable
eciencies from unveriable barriers, the impact of eciencies on the defendants chance of
winning could be better evaluated. Additionally, separating structural barriers from strategic
barriers would likely better capture the eect of barriers to entry on the defendants chance of
winning. All but two of my cases had barriers to entry. Thus, by separating out the various
types of barriers and eciencies, a future study could look at how each individually eects
the defendants chance of winning. Likewise, each competitive/anticompetitive eect could
be studied individually. I, in emulation of Coate (1995), turn the net number of competitive
and anticompetitive eects into a single variable called netcon for ease of analysis.
My research time period spans the Great Recession 2008 and I look at merger activity
before and after this period. I nd merger activity trends downward during 2008-9 which is
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consistent with economic theory. Waldman and Jensen (2013) state that during economic
recessions less mergers occur. As expected, I nd that total merger occurrence follows
economic business cycles, but the number litigated increases after the 2010 Guidelines and
may reect a pro-enforcement federal ideology. Also, the Great Recession is believed to
be partly caused by a lack of oversight of businesses by the federal government leading to
a rebound over-regulation eect. Any eect of economic growth on merger activity may
be diminished by the rebound over-regulation following the Great Recession. Unfortunately,
due to my small sample size and confounding variables, cause and eect cannot be concluded.
I am concerned that the DOJ is not systematic in its approach to horizontal merger
enforcement, as documented in the Competitive Impact Statements that I read from 2005-
15. Also, I am struck by the lack of proven predictability of some of the methods like
cost analysis, diversion ratio, and HMT which are used by the courts to reach a decision.
Moreover, I am appalled by the leading role ideology of the courts plays in its decisions and
the impact court's ideology plays on businesses' decision to merge. Overall, the DOJ halts
less than 20 horizontal mergers each year from 2005-15 and the eects of this number on the
economy is unknown.
The policy implication of my research is that economists and antitrust lawyers need to
come together and work on templates that can be used to assess anticompetitive behavior
in antitrust decisions to insure fairness and consistency in enforcement. Underlying such
templates is sound analysis. Improvement is needed in existing formulas for cost analysis,
diversion ratio, HMT, and modeling. Also, more retrospective studies should be performed
to evaluate Type I and Type II errors with each formula. Additionally, up-to-date research
from econometrics and industrial organization should be incorporated to improve models of
anticompetitive merger behavior.
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Table 3: Linear Regression Results
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES DefendantWins DefendantWins DefendantWins
PostmergerHHI -7.18e-06 -7.42e-06
(8.06e-06) (8.09e-06)
NetCon -0.0394** -0.0393**
(0.0164) (0.0165)
Eciency 0.0737 0.0773
(0.0584) (0.0587)
PoliticalParty -0.0357 -0.100**
(0.0418) (0.0425)
CaseLength -0.00318 -0.00357 -0.000682
(0.00263) (0.00268) (0.00301)
1.RelevantMarket: N.A. -0.138
(0.140)
2.RelevantMarket: U.S. -0.0412
(0.122)
3.RelevantMarket: Region -0.120
(0.122)
4.RelevantMarket: Local -0.138
(0.137)
2005 0.0911 0.0693 0.0341
(0.177) (0.179) (0.170)
2006 0.00583 0.00110 0.0121
(0.103) (0.103) (0.118)
2007 0.00349 0.0185 0.0918
(0.129) (0.130) (0.147)
2008 0.0119 0.0130 0.0268
(0.0727) (0.0729) (0.0828)
2009 0.0315 0.0457 0.0462
(0.110) (0.111) (0.128)
2011 0.260*** 0.263*** 0.231***
(0.0799) (0.0803) (0.0870)
2012 0.0212 0.0176 0.0511
(0.103) (0.103) (0.119)
2013 -0.0144 -0.00144 0.173
(0.100) (0.102) (0.106)
2014 0.0124 0.0182 0.0320
(0.0869) (0.0874) (0.0965)
2015 -0.00629 0.0127 0.0817
(0.0922) (0.0951) (0.109)
2016 0.00489 0.00586 0.176
(0.115) (0.115) (0.109)
Constant 0.189* 0.215** 0.139
(0.102) (0.106) (0.133)
Observations 65 65 94
R-squared 0.336 0.346 0.232
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Linear Regression Results Using Change HHI
(1) (2)
VARIABLES DefendantWins DefendantWins
ChangeinHHI -1.88e-05 -1.79e-05
(1.88e-05) (1.86e-05)
NetCon -0.0541** -0.0583**
(0.0225) (0.0225)
Eciency 0.0884 0.104
(0.0688) (0.0693)
PoliticalParty -0.0631
(0.0496)
CaseLength -0.00306 -0.00372
(0.00292) (0.00294)
2005 0.116 0.0689
(0.198) (0.200)
2006 -0.00342 -0.0230
(0.121) (0.121)
2007 0.0540 0.0777
(0.192) (0.192)
2008 -0.0146 -0.0313
(0.0931) (0.0933)
2009 0.0253 0.0399
(0.124) (0.123)
2011 0.267*** 0.260**
(0.0976) (0.0970)
2012 0.00466 -0.0108
(0.118) (0.118)
2013 -0.0377 -0.0295
(0.118) (0.117)
2014 -0.0289 -0.0265
(0.114) (0.113)
2015 -0.0329 -0.00970
(0.109) (0.109)
2016 -0.00435 -0.0249
(0.150) (0.149)
Constant 0.254** 0.321**
(0.125) (0.135)
Observations 54 54
R-squared 0.409 0.434
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Linear Regression Results for After 2010
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES DefendantWins DefendantWins DefendantWins
PostmergerHHI -5.04e-06 -5.06e-06
(1.41e-05) (1.42e-05)
NetCon -0.106*** -0.109***
(0.0349) (0.0352)
Eciency 0.164 0.150
(0.136) (0.137)
PoliticalParty -0.0586 -0.214***
(0.0656) (0.0721)
CaseLength -0.00265 -0.00331 -0.000956
(0.00360) (0.00369) (0.00463)
1.RelevantMarket: N.A. -0.313
(0.234)
2.RelevantMarket: U.S. 0.0135
(0.189)
3.RelevantMarket: Region -0.198
(0.184)
4.RelevantMarket: Local -0.287
(0.223)
2012.FinalJudgmentYear -0.239* -0.255* -0.145
(0.127) (0.128) (0.160)
2013.FinalJudgmentYear -0.332** -0.318** -0.0592
(0.125) (0.127) (0.138)
2014.FinalJudgmentYear -0.284** -0.287** -0.196
(0.109) (0.110) (0.127)
2015.FinalJudgmentYear -0.292** -0.272** -0.0823
(0.117) (0.120) (0.142)
2016.FinalJudgmentYear -0.285* -0.296* -0.0949
(0.146) (0.147) (0.149)
Constant 0.685*** 0.746*** 0.502***
(0.174) (0.188) (0.182)
Observations 34 34 50
R-squared 0.486 0.504 0.321
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Linear Regression Using Beginning Years
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES DefendantWins DefendantWins DefendantWins
PostmergerHHI -3.16e-06 -4.06e-06
(8.30e-06) (8.21e-06)
NetCon -0.0360* -0.0359*
(0.0182) (0.0180)
Eciency 0.0843 0.101*
(0.0582) (0.0584)
PoliticalParty -0.0637 -0.108**
(0.0410) (0.0433)
CaseLength -0.000665 -0.000921 0.00190
(0.00279) (0.00276) (0.00311)
1.RelevantMarket: N.A. -0.192
(0.139)
2.RelevantMarket: U.S. -0.0955
(0.122)
3.RelevantMarket: Region -0.164
(0.121)
4.RelevantMarket: Local -0.187
(0.138)
beginningyear: 2005 -0.0275 -0.0357 -0.0595
(0.108) (0.107) (0.122)
beginningyear: 2006 0.00397 0.000998 -0.105
(0.113) (0.112) (0.131)
beginningyear: 2007 -0.00458 -0.0171 -0.115
(0.103) (0.102) (0.113)
beginningyear: 2008 -0.0475 -0.0379 -0.0711
(0.0827) (0.0818) (0.0937)
beginningyear: 2009 -0.0747 -0.0999 -0.132
(0.121) (0.120) (0.135)
beginningyear: 2011 0.219** 0.234** 0.109
(0.0906) (0.0898) (0.0992)
beginningyear: 2012 -0.0680 -0.0773 0.0144
(0.113) (0.111) (0.114)
beginningyear: 2013 -0.0165 -0.00282 -0.0379
(0.104) (0.103) (0.129)
beginningyear: 2014 -0.0269 -0.0162 -0.0517
(0.0918) (0.0908) (0.104)
beginningyear: 2015 -0.0314 0.00744 0.0510
(0.107) (0.109) (0.107)
Constant 0.172 0.216* 0.279**
(0.119) (0.121) (0.129)
Observations 65 65 94
R-squared 0.321 0.353 0.198
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Linear Regression Resulting Using Change in HHI and Using Beginning Years
(1) (2)
VARIABLES DefendantWins DefendantWins
ChangeinHHI -6.95e-06 -8.35e-06
(1.83e-05) (1.77e-05)
NetCon -0.0516** -0.0562**
(0.0241) (0.0235)
Eciency 0.118* 0.146**
(0.0687) (0.0683)
PoliticalParty -0.0877*
(0.0468)
CaseLength -0.000309 -0.000603
(0.00309) (0.00300)
beginningyear1 0.0151 -0.00898
(0.126) (0.123)
beginningyear2 -0.00289 -0.0110
(0.122) (0.119)
beginningyear3 -0.0139 -0.0448
(0.123) (0.121)
beginningyear4 -0.0774 -0.0760
(0.0928) (0.0900)
o.beginningyear5 - -
beginningyear7 0.224** 0.236**
(0.103) (0.0997)
beginningyear8 -0.0999 -0.123
(0.125) (0.122)
beginningyear9 -0.0249 -0.0114
(0.113) (0.110)
beginningyear10 -0.0580 -0.0442
(0.107) (0.104)
beginningyear11 -0.0480 0.00162
(0.121) (0.120)
Constant 0.232 0.311**
(0.140) (0.143)
Observations 54 54
R-squared 0.383 0.434
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Linear Regression Results for After 2010 and using Beginning Years
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES DefendantWins DefendantWins DefendantWins
PostmergerHHI -3.29e-06 -4.67e-06
(1.54e-05) (1.53e-05)
NetCon -0.0966** -0.102**
(0.0441) (0.0439)
Eciency 0.310* 0.285
(0.177) (0.176)
PoliticalParty -0.0862 -0.208***
(0.0701) (0.0714)
CaseLength -0.00472 -0.00344 0.00939
(0.00818) (0.00815) (0.00858)
1.RelevantMarket: N.A. -0.0402
(0.244)
2.RelevantMarket: U.S. 0.235
(0.211)
3.RelevantMarket:Region 0.0451
(0.209)
4.RelevantMarket: Local -0.0551
(0.248)
2012.CaseOpenYear -0.347** -0.388** -0.173
(0.138) (0.140) (0.145)
2013.CaseOpenYear -0.203 -0.213* -0.149
(0.122) (0.121) (0.151)
2014.CaseOpenYear -0.235** -0.245** -0.165
(0.105) (0.104) (0.117)
2015.CaseOpenYear -0.257* -0.229* -0.109
(0.128) (0.128) (0.121)
Constant 0.607*** 0.706*** 0.221
(0.215) (0.227) (0.226)
Observations 31 31 45
R-squared 0.497 0.531 0.320
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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